Essays on Hegel’s Philosophy of Science. Volume 2

Бесплатный фрагмент - Essays on Hegel’s Philosophy of Science. Volume 2

Объем: 123 бумажных стр.

Формат: epub, fb2, pdfRead, mobi


Intellectual achievements development

Hegel was not limited to any one topic, he was busy with the problems of politics, logic, law, political philosophy, the philosophical history of science and metaphysics, as well as the metaphysics of knowledge. His writings and lectures give us an idea of the depth and breadth of his thinking. Hegel was one of the greatest philosophers of the nineteenth century.

Hegel gives us a list of categories in the metaphysics of knowledge. These categories are: Being, Idea, Mind, Thought, Consciousness and Event. Of these categories, he cited the first four specific examples: being, idea, mind, and thought. He describes each as representing a lower level of knowledge, and these categories are subdivided into more advanced levels of knowledge. The categories are consistent with Hegel’s assertion that Being, Thought, Consciousness, and Event are not absolute categories. They give rise to other related categories. They are distinguished by the structure of other categories. He further divides categories into six higher levels of knowledge: mental, intellectual, inherently biased, implicit, primitive, controversial, and principled. There is the highest level of knowledge, and this is defined as having an innate sense of right and justice. Following the Hegelian definition of being, the intellectual is a term used for those who have knowledge that does not follow the rules and practices of society and wants to change it. The intellectual is represented by Socrates and Aristophanes and shows that knowledge can take a certain form and the desire of those who have knowledge to change it. Intellectual are divided into implicit, controversial and principle. Implicit is a hidden quality in people that makes them restless and dissatisfied with their social circumstances. Controversial shows those who have a certain set of beliefs and can find a reason to oppose it. The principle shows those who want to impose their ideas and principles on others in order to create a new social order. Finally, the principle is represented by Confucius and said that people who pursue their own interests should prevail over those who follow their own interests.

Hegel gives examples of the development of intellectual achievements. We should not confuse the pursuit of intellectual knowledge and pursuits such as business or knowledge of art. He gives us three examples of the emergence of knowledge in business: intelligence, personality, and religion. Intellectuality is represented by the philosopher David Hume and shows that knowledge and science are related to the idea of science. Hume offers an example of the difference between science and metaphysics. In metaphysics, knowledge does not exist as a concept in itself. Its existence is reduced to natural phenomena and the passage of time. In contrast, science follows a simple set of rules of logic and observation and can explain more phenomena in greater detail. The second example is the secular society in Europe. Scholars of the 17th and 18th centuries were against religious values and religious practices that were associated with secular society. For the most part, this led to a break with traditional religious ideals and rituals. As a consequence, some religious practices were abandoned while others were reformed. Religious beliefs began to change due to scientific discoveries, and secular values began to be defended. While this was a positive development, secular values led to a change in some religious beliefs, and by combining scientific knowledge with religious beliefs, it created new prejudices and ideas.

The third example is the discovery of the structure of matter. New knowledge showed that while matter was produced by the combustion of atomic forms, atoms of different energies were produced and formed a specific structure. These discoveries led to a new religious conflict between those who advocated the importance of material things, and the materialistic view that all that is needed in the material world is matter. Of course, the materialistic view is a prejudice against something intangible, but it is also criticized by religious believers who consider their religious beliefs to be eternal and, above all, those things that are of a different nature.

Religion is divided into different ways of thinking, and knowledge is divided into different disciplines. Since all these views and divisions are associated with different political positions, religion is separated from society and politics. As politics goes further, the division becomes so complete that religion begins to seem immoral and people begin to criticize their religious believes, in the case of the Catholic Church. Hegel shows that this criticism is largely based on premises that have become known to people as secular philosophy. Philosophical Hegel shows that the materialistic and secular idea that people who hold religious beliefs cannot have knowledge and, therefore, cannot be held accountable for their actions, leads people to ignore the religious ideas of their ancestors.

Political discourse

Hegel provides another example of how natural and political understanding can be radically different. He says that if someone believes that he has knowledge that is a consequence of the historical experience of his people, then this person claims power over this society, which must be determined a priori. It is impossible to conduct a political discussion about a particular form of government that should apply to a particular society. In other words, a person who claims to have such knowledge is only claiming that he has the right to rule this particular society. This means that if you try to discuss a political issue with someone who has this point of view, it becomes clear that he does not want you to participate in this discussion and is trying to suppress it. Hegel says that such a situation can arise when a certain form of government is declared natural, and other forms of government are criticized. This is why it is very important to understand the difference between political and economic discourse.

Hegel’s analysis of political discourse is another theory that demonstrates that Hegel can apply what he says in later parts of Logic to earlier parts. For example, Hegel says that business is based on the natural form of the mind that flows from the laws of nature. This natural form of mind cannot be simply replaced by something else. This natural form of mind is the rational perception that things have their own special forms. In the logic of political discourse, there is the idea of economics, which is a natural form. This economic form of reason concludes that government, even if it is democratically elected, will behave in a certain way. In other words, this political form of reason draws its conclusions from the natural form. This is the reason that every government in the world, no matter what political system it is, will operate with a natural form of government. For example, democracy. Democracy is based on natural forms, and this naturally defines government as a form of government. Democracy works with the idea of government responsibility to its citizens. If the citizens of a country do not like the government of this country, they have the right to change their government.

When you think about what the government should do, it is normal that political leaders are trying to give people a political vision that can give direction to their lives and a vision of the social ideal of society. This vision takes the form of the logic of the economic form. The economic logic of a political form allows political policies to be pursued that satisfy the natural form of the minds of people and give them the right to rule. The logic of economic form follows natural forms. On the other hand, the logic of political form is rooted in the natural order of things and works with the idea of political order and government as a natural necessity. This political order is natural for economic processes to work efficiently and to satisfy people. This is why, for example, it is normal for political leaders to follow political discourse. They will work to convince people to vote for them.

The logic of economic discourse may work differently. He does not consider natural forms to be ideal forms. However, economic discourse can change natural forms of government. That is, economic logic can change natural forms. This is also a form of democracy. For example, all citizens have the right to vote. Voting is a form of democratic thinking that changes the natural form of government and gives it a different form. This is why political debate must be based on economic form. This is the reason that economic thinkers, economic politicians, economic philosophers, economists and political theorists must work with a certain logic of economic discourse. This economic logic can also be applied to the logic of political discourse. All of these ideas can be used to explain how political discourse works.

History of philosophy

The history of philosophy is, in essence, an internally necessary, consistent progressive movement, rational within itself and determined by its idea of progress. The great historian Robert Schumann gives in his essays a typical definition of history, which is based on our modern understanding of history, namely: history is a change, from time to time, and, therefore, a change in the direction of new development. In the German tradition, Hegel’s idea is a great exponent of history and change. For Hegel, history is a development to a new stage of human consciousness, namely to modernity, when humanity has reached the stage of absolute understanding. In this sense, Hegel forms part of the philosophical tradition of the idea of history and, as such, a significant period of modern intellectual history. This is the time when all existing forms of human knowledge were studied and when all existing models of thinking were met and overcome in search of new theories of knowledge, the time of tremendous discoveries, the progress of human understanding through awareness. new principles of thinking. This is because human knowledge has become universal, the realization that human understanding can go beyond human imagination. And this also extends to the realm of science, where today, thanks to new scientific advances, we can experience much more than the idea of a universal history of mankind. And today the scientific efforts of human intelligence are sufficient to form the basis for the possible development of any other way of thinking, the discovery of new concepts, new ideas and new concepts, knowledge of new processes. This is the same development in which human life is based on philosophical ideas, and this is why in our modern era we see scientific and philosophical ideas merge into a curious and evolving pattern. And the same way of thinking is how the history of philosophy is viewed today. And we can observe that when it comes to the history of philosophy, there is a significant difference between modernity and historical progress. So, today we can really talk about historical progress, since all this intellectual movement, which is called history, is a movement towards the possibility of increasing knowledge. The modern world, which makes up much of modern intellectual history, is consistent with this belief in intellectual progress. Thus, intellectual thinking, which in the beginning was neither mental nor universal, has now become a universal part of human thinking, and it is a universal process based on philosophical ideas. It is in this way that modern history begins with the recognition of the truth of intellectual thought and the possibility that all intellectual ideas are not determined by the emergence of human imagination, but are in fact products of human consciousness and the further development of human consciousness and human understanding. And it is this emerging universal consciousness that underlies all intellectual concepts. And since all intellectual ideas are of human origin, it is possible that the intellectual concepts themselves could have arisen as mental concepts that were created in the human imagination or that were given in an imaginary way to the human mind. And, accordingly, since we realized that all intellectual concepts are of human origin, intellectual concepts can acquire philosophical significance. In other words, it is necessary that a given intellectual idea has a certain content that could develop its own spiritual value in the field of philosophy. And it is in this sense that intellectual concepts and intellectual progress have become more philosophical than they were before, that they can become models for the development of a philosophical approach. And this is the situation in which the history of philosophy begins today. In other words, since all intellectual concepts are directed towards intellectual progress, it is possible that they can reach a form of philosophical knowledge and that this philosophical knowledge can take on philosophical values. And it is precisely this philosophical value that develops in the field of history, and, therefore, it will develop further, and this will give rise to a much more philosophical understanding of the history of philosophy. Thus, the intellectual concepts of modernity give rise to philosophical discourse, the philosophical meaning of the history of philosophy. This gives rise to an idea of progress in the modern era and gives rise to the idea of a spirit of knowledge. The modern meaning of the word «spirit of knowledge» can be understood in a very broad sense, including the religious one. When we say the spirit of knowledge, we mean the spirit of a certain way of thinking, a certain understanding of the world, which was formed by intellectual ideas and was taken into the sphere of human knowledge, human thinking. It can be said that in this sense, every intellectual idea has a human origin, and this is true, since all intellectual ideas, as we said, have their own internal structure and their own independent status. And, therefore, it is possible that since intellectual concepts are not defined in the way that they relate to human imagination, they are not necessarily determined by human rationality. The human mind also cannot define these intellectual ideas, because these intellectual concepts and intellectual ideas belong to a higher category, they are only characteristics of people. In other words, human rationality is not an absolute principle that defines the world of human thought, since human rationality is a perspective that can take into account different aspects of the world. The human mind is a way of looking at things. But the human mind does not occupy an absolute position in all human thinking. Thus, the spirit of knowledge exists in the fact that this spirit of knowledge is therefore shaped by intellectual concepts. And the very idea of the spirit of knowledge does not deny the very idea of knowledge. So, although the spirit of knowledge is not determined by human rationality, it is nevertheless an element of general thought.

The concept of true dialectics consists in the discovery of truth through an understanding of the conditions of human existence. Truth consists in finding a way to objectively observe the world, in observing the conditions of human existence in its environment. Reason cannot replace experience, just as experience cannot replace reason. As things in nature change, so do the conditions of human nature.

However, Hegel’s dialectic was not given to create new circumstances. As in the history of mankind, the realities of time are the true values of human vision. Time is a field of vision. The mind, despite its rich experience, is not devoid of vision. Hegel’s philosophy is not a philosophy of the field of vision. While the mind is a valuable tool in interpreting existing reality, it is not a timeless truth. Reason is not a substitute for experience. Even if experience has proven superior, it does not replace reason.

Logic is divided into three parts: the doctrine of being, essence and concept. The doctrine of being is a complete logic that is carried out in all logical systems: for example, when analyzing sentences. The doctrine of being is now the central doctrine in much of continental logic. Hegel defined it as the ideal of morality, value truth.

Wisdom is primarily a synthesis of reason and intellect. Wisdom does not necessarily lead to an objective knowledge of the world. Wisdom must take into account the limitation of knowledge, which is primarily limited to knowledge of a specific form of the world. The reason for the emergence of wisdom is that the intellect finds contradiction in itself. He is looking for this contradiction. This contradiction is the center, the limit of knowledge.

Hegel stated: «Limits are the wisdom of the imagination. And to have them means to have truth or intelligence, which can then recognize them in the world. This truth and reason are the truth and the cause of the manifestation of nature.

Marx’s criticism of Hegel’s metaphysics

Central to Marx’s position is his criticism of Hegel’s metaphysics and its speculative combination of reason and reality. Marx writes: «At the heart of our science is a fundamental contradiction, and this is the contradiction between mind and matter.»

If spirit becomes objective and begins to act in its own self-consciousness, or if matter turns into an external force and thereby becomes an object of consciousness, then this alienation will be inevitable. The fact is that the separation of spirit from matter, which forms the basis of our religion and our philosophy, should have actually happened.

Here Marx tried to develop, with the help of Hegelian philosophy, a criticism of the materialist concept of reality based on the idea of spirit. This view is a fundamental element of Marx’s understanding of the world.

It is inappropriate to read Marx, who wrote in Capital or German Ideology, as claiming that «the dependence of our ideas on reality» is equally important for consciousness in the physical and mental world. In «materialistic philosophy,» feeling and thinking are ultimately linked: «Where sensation is unreal, matter has become the subject of serious consideration. Where matter is not just a fiction, but reality, the spiritual is the expression of the subjective, that is, the subjective subject itself. «This relationship between the physical and the mental is reflected in a comprehensive and wide-ranging analysis of Marx’s subjectivity.

According to this thesis, we can understand what we call «mind» or «subjective ability» by studying the relationship between two things that are involved in conscious life in general: the physical world and our thinking. On the contrary, what is most important in the physical world as such is that «to understand it means to grasp not only the feeling with which we identify the physical object, but also the thought that corresponds to it. This similarity between feeling and thought occurs only due to the decisive role played by materiality, which is characterized as material due to the ability to transform into thought. «In this, Marx rejects the view of «non-materialism», that is, a concept that considers the objective world only as physical and, therefore, as belonging to the sphere of self-consciousness.

However, this point of view of Hegel is not accidental. Materialism is not only pushed aside, but is in contradiction with itself. The process of materialism is not only explained by the subjectivity of thinking, but since thought is used to try to understand the world, it itself is seen as analytical in its «identification of feeling and thought.» This requires faith: «When considering the process of perceiving the objective world, a person is forced to deny the possibility of his repression, the possibility of changing his character; on the contrary, this recognition makes him, so to speak, fall back to the ground, into his essence.»

Denying its possibility is the formal basis of the analysis that dominates the rest of Capital. It is this leap that makes possible the connections between materialism and thought. The connection between matter and mind is also expressed in Hegel’s criticism of idealism, namely, that idealism «identifies consciousness, which sees the world, born as consciousness, with the world that has arisen.» These ideas were part of dialectics, and the rejection of this interpretation shows the limits of the romantic approach to Hegel, whose positions at times seemed closer to materialism than to idealism.

For Marx, Hegel’s position is essentially the same as Hegel’s in his discussion of the process of the formation of consciousness. «He does not recognize the secret tendency of the history of thought (which he associates with different modes of thought) and does not try to replace it with an appropriate appearance; instead, he recognizes it, because it is natural, as a movement of thought, as a process of cognition and understanding, and he attributes to it the characteristic features of two such processes: one that occurs as a result of reason, and the other as an effect of necessity. «The problem here is that the only way to reconcile these two processes is to assume that the two processes have the same logic, and this is where Hegel solves the problem. But this must mean that both of them must be equally real, since they lead to the same conclusion: «Reason or reason as consciousness (and by its very nature this applies only to itself), makes itself visible, but not itself yourself.» Essentially, Hegel is claiming that the same logic must contain the result of reason and necessity. Both are the result of a non-existent «super concept». For Hegel, this contradiction proves that consciousness is the only true force. The only way to go through with it is to develop an analysis showing the super-concept forms.

Only after the conflict of dialectics between the two extremes of thinking and nature, the gap between the two theses can be overcome with the help of the concept of abstraction from the forms of superconception. For it is not just a matter of replacing a superconception with another, but also re-appropriating what used to be a «manifestation» of the mind in order to give the mind the truth internally embedded in it. This is what is at stake in Hegel’s analysis. What «determines» the forms of nature? Forms that are inherited as part of Hegel’s inheritance, namely categories that include definitions of subject and object. «With all this,» adds Marx, «it is the basic principle of reason that it cannot determine anything in nature.»

Faced with the experience of the same process with materialism in general, and with his conception of Hegel in particular, Marx thought that the way is open to an explanation of how the mind is formed as a reflection, can correctly decide on its own, whether it should be a «giver of knowledge» or «knowledge receiver». Rather than replacing the superconcept with another, it is something that depends on the types of relationship that each kind of reflection causes. Once again Hegel leads Marx astray. He abandoned the logical-mathematical language of mathematics in order to express these relations in the language of dialectical thinking. This is not the essence of dialectical thinking. For Marx, dialectic is not a fantasy of metaphysics. «Dialectics,» writes Marx, «is a method by which the main signifier, the negation of negation, the idea of negation, enters the work of the cognizing subject, the sphere of thought, in such a way that it belongs to all thinking.» It is a dialectic that asks questions and has answers in such a way that only what has already been said is given. Dialectics is the way in which the many views accumulated in consciousness and the variety of different points of view from which they are formed are used to create two dominant themes of thought. It is the mechanism by which ideas are broken down into categories of objectivity and subjectivity. The line between objectivity and subjectivity is blurred because each object is subjective in itself, or, in other words, all views are expressed in a language that gives consistency to its ideological form. If there is no opposite to it, then nothing can be invented; if one side is dominant this cannot be questioned; and once such domination has been achieved, opposition can no longer be postulated, because domination is thus complete. This does not mean that dialectics itself presupposes a totalitarian rule of the central mind, it means that only the dominant polemics gain a place in the system. For Marx, this means that ideas dominating all other points of view are formed within the framework of «dialectical thinking.»

There are various ways of understanding dialectics, but I think that it is only through an examination of how «dialectical thought» dominates over «objective» thought that one can properly assess its nature and its relation to communism. On the way to communism, it is necessary to go through the Hegelian aspects of dialectics.

The great goal of Hegel’s philosophy, the absolute Idea, must be realized through the realization of the Idea as a series of abstractly designed and increasingly concrete forms of sensible things. So, Hegel places the highest form of the sensible manifestation of the Idea in the reality of the spatial whole and thus integrates nature into the whole. Hegel tells us that through its concept of incarnation, nature becomes a reflection of the Idea. This is not an easy term to understand, since being embodied in its concept simply means that the form of a thing, be it a real object or a general concept, expresses a sensory «feature» that exists independently of it. In the following passage, we can find some basis for understanding this concept:

«If the Idea (or sensible things) is reflected in nature, we could say that in the Idea in this simple form, which is in this sensible thing, the object’s way of being is reflected in the idea’s way of being in nature; thus nature is the sensuous expression of the Idea. Or, in other words, this I action is the basis of nature that exists in the I action; and the form of this sensible thing is the Idea, which is the form of this sensible thing or the way in which this sensible thing is the way of existence of Idea.»

Hegel means that nature has a certain form, but since it has a form that corresponds to the general concept of form, nature cannot directly know its own form, because it is not reflected in a single copy. This means that nature cannot know that it exists. But since it is possible to see a different perspective associated with the Idea, the image of this other perspective is in the concrete being of the subject. «Reflection is reflection.» This image reveals the truth that the comprehensible Idea is the form of all things, so that what is determined is the form of the Idea, but it is not determined from it. The relationship between form and matter is a «dialectical» relationship: subject and form. The whole is in its representation (apodosis), so that everything that exists is in its relation to the whole, being positive or negative matter. This explains how this whole, although «complex», is subjectively a unity in itself, since even in their negativity, all things are «entities of unity» that make up the entire content of the universe. The whole being is defined in this «essence». Consequently, the whole universe is a unity of three things: Idea, object and form. The fact that things exist is mediated by their form. The two forms of matter are negative and positive matter, which can be distinguished. Although the entire universe, from the smallest atom to the universe itself, is immanent to the concept of form, «form» is not identical with the concept of «matter.» Matter is abstractly defined as matter. In a sense, everything is matter, but for Hegel, «matter» and «form» are different terms, and not all matter consists of elements that can be measured. That is, the form is the same part of matter as the negative form. Theoretical and metaphysical rationalism, despite the fact that he is a product of education should cover the union of two forms of matter in the form of philosophical humanism, in which there is no intelligibility of the universe and the relationship between object and subject, therefore, to the need to define its a priori definitions possibility in terms of the relationship of a pure concept to nature.

This means that the universe as a whole is nothing more than three moments. Consequently, the dialectical approach to «objective» philosophy is to discover the preconditions and prerequisites for individual moments and look at their specific relationship to each other. The «form» of nature is the «definite form» of the Idea, which forms everything that exists. Consequently, in nature, other moments are reflected in the form of an Idea, and each moment is its own existence. Matter itself does not exist, since it is the form of an object of nature or the Idea in its form. This does not mean that the object’s shape is part of the object’s existence, but that the object itself is a unique form of matter.

In a sense, the form of an object is «obvious» only in its way of being, but the object itself exists in its way of being, not in its form. The form of an object exists from the content of the Idea; but the mode of its existence lies in its nature, not in its form. Thus, nature is the absolute form of the Idea. Matter does not exist outside of the concept of form; he and the associated idea, but not a «subject» of the idea. Nature is the form of the form itself. However, this shape is not identical to the shape of the object. Matter may be the form of an object, but it is not the nature of the object. In nature, the form of the form itself is also the form of an object. The form of an object, being a form, encompasses the nature of form. For example, form is the form of an idea, but it is not necessarily the same as the idea, and therefore cannot itself be the nature of the idea. Everything is subject to its own form, being the form of its own content, but it does not exist as a universal form, universal in the sense that it is not determined by anything else. Matter exists in its aspect as the form of an object, but is not determined by it. Although matter is in its own aspect, the form of form is not determined from it; it is its own content. Consequently, matter is determined by its content.

Marx’s criticism of the Hegelian philosophy of the absolute spirit

Central to Marx’s criticism of Hegel is the defense of materialism over idealism. Marx criticizes Hegel’s philosophy of the absolute spirit:

He tries to find in philosophy the immediate truth behind the order of phenomena. It is impossible to find this immediate truth; it is the furthest and most distant thing that can be. … «This is the main mistake of Hegel’s philosophy»:

In Hegel’s philosophy, represented by dialectics, man proceeds from the totality or finitude of things as a whole and at the same time from that which is limited and transient, that is, from the will. There is a paradox here: on the one hand, the «totality or finiteness of things» of Hegel’s philosophy is one and the same with its «limited and transient» aspect; on the other hand, this is never the basis for the development of the latter.

Thus, in Hegel’s philosophy there is a paradox: on the one hand, there is a need to comprehend the essence of things, and on the other hand, there is a movement that (always imperfect and constantly approaching a given reality) requires constant research, transformation and definition of this essence. But only in the latter, in the movement of the infinite infinitely in time and space, we come to the knowledge of the essential essence, that is, the eternal good.…

Thus, from Hegel’s dialectic comes the liberation of the ego from the world of phenomena in itself. This is not the liberation of man from the world of phenomena in himself, but the liberation of man from the very world of phenomena in himself.

Only by striving to resolve this paradox does Hegel’s philosophy find its rational foundation. This is, in essence, a criticism of Hegel by Marx. The political, philosophical and historical knowledge necessary to free people from the need to react to the outside world is not found in Hegel. It must be sought in science and in the social sciences.

Followers of Marx, at least in the West, tend to treat Hegel as if the latter were a kind of scientific-theoretical system that admits a satisfactory philosophy. They forget that for Hegel, philosophy was only one of many ways of solving human problems and realizing their rational functions.

In Marx’s own critical analysis, «science» is not the «genius of a philosopher.» On the contrary, science «is the creative activity of the human mind.» This is an attempt to understand the world in order to put it in proper order. This process, according to Marx, provides both criticism and guidance to the process of conscious human activity.

Criticism is necessary because without it we cannot understand reality and take the necessary action. For Marx, this means that knowledge of nature and society must be the basis for action. For example, both Marxism and the social sciences must explain why we are all still in this world and whether we should ever leave it. «Action is logical only when it presupposes the infinite will of the subject.» However, action becomes impossible if we do not realize that our desires are not immediately and automatically satisfied and that we must follow our desires in a rational way.

Thus, for Marx, science is not the domain of the scientist, but the domain of the emancipated «scientific intellect a». Like conscience, scientific intelligence is aware of the limits of reason, which cannot always make itself understandable. As Marx says:

«Intelligence can be found in every person, to a greater or lesser extent, in each of us; he is always the one who must overcome himself, go beyond himself and understand what is outside of it, what is this world, what is society, this is the world of social relations and social forces.»

And, as Marx points out, this revelation is incomplete: «He who does not understand this in himself does not understand it at all.» In the first two books of Capital, Marx often points out that science is always one step away from exhaustion and how we must balance self-criticism with a rational need for knowledge. The question is how to use knowledge «correctly», but correctly, without obeying the relativistic tendencies of modern philosophical discourse.

About Marx’s Political Economy Critique

In his 1844 Manuscripts, Marx began his criticism of political economy, which resulted in the volumes of Capital.

The first volume of Capital (1853) is entitled 1843—44 as a criticism of his own dissertation. In this book, Marx sets out the foundations of his critique of political economy. This is a criticism of the economy of the period before the capitalist mode of production fully developed and the commercial value of goods was not established. The failure of the political economy of this period, as well as of the economic analysis of the period preceding it, is that he was not aware of the dialectical development of productive forces or the accumulation of capital.

The first volume of Capital is largely a controversy in which Marx criticizes several economists, a number of his own books, and Hegel’s philosophy for their misunderstanding of this development. However, this controversy does not include an analysis of the real nature of political economy, which can only be found in the second and third volumes of Capital. Dialectical elements in these two volumes were to appear later, in criticism of value and in the analysis of political economy.

The first section of the first volume of Capital is a critique of Smith’s theory of interest. In this book, Marx seeks to expose the fundamental lie of the capitalist system by showing that it is not a natural process and that it should be understood in a revolutionary way. This is especially true of Marx, who believes that the main problem lies in the inexorable growth of the reserve army of labor. Marx sets out the main idea of his criticism in this book:

«The amount of labor required to produce any particular commodity is not equal to the amount of labor required to produce all other commodities in the same proportion. Consequently, the capitalist cannot claim that his purchase of labor power has always been «fair» for him, because his means of payment have always been «fair» for him; the amount of labor required to produce goods has never been the same.

Labor costs may vary depending on the quality of the product, as in the case of a cotton carding machine, and the money paid by the manufacturer will be identical to the cost of the carded fabric; or it may vary depending on the size of the firm, and the amount of paid work may be proportionately higher.»

Of course, Marx’s aim was to demonstrate that the same value of labor power should be paid for the same commodity at a higher price, and that the actual value of the commodity sold was increased by this increase in the amount of labor, required for its production.

The problem is that in the case of the first point, the value of goods must be determined based on the value of labor, which is based on the marginal product of labor. This is a simple logical equation. However, the second point has been shown to be incorrect, since the same amount of labor must be expended to produce all other commodities in the same proportion. Consequently, the price of all other commodities must be determined by their marginal production. The price of labor itself has not changed.

The book develops this idea by showing how, in the case of many commodities, the actual value of the commodities themselves was increased by this cost of labor. This shows that in the case of many commodities, the real price of all other commodities is in fact lower than the true value of their exchange value.

The main work of Marx on this issue — it is in fact the case «Fractional color.» In this work, Marx goes so far as to even declare: «The degree of exploitation of the working class by the capitalist class is the highest of all the contradictions of bourgeois society.»

The true value of the products of labor is, in fact, the real value of the goods themselves. This is the basis of Marx’s criticism of surplus value, which is based on the following two stages: (1) the production of the product itself and (2) the subsequent exchange of products with other products. The price of the product produced determines the price of all other products. The price of labor power determines the price of other commodities, which means that the price of labor power determines the price of all other commodities.

Marx’s contribution to the critique of surplus value is as follows: since the prices of labor and the commodity produced are determined by the same amount of labor, the price of labor determines the price of all other commodities. Consequently, the marginal product of labor is determined by the amount of labor expended and, therefore, is a product of labor.

Therefore, it is impossible for the price of labor power to be the same as the price of other commodities, as the critic Marx argued. Prices should be determined by their marginal products, not by their cost of production.

In the light of this theory, it becomes clear that Marx’s criticism of surplus value is also based on his criticism of alienation.

Marx’s goal was to show that the subjective qualities of the products of labor, their use value and their exchange value are in fact determined by the labor expended in their production. This is, of course, true of the workforce. As for the rest of the products of labor, the only way to maintain the illusion that they belong to society is to assert that they have a material content, independent of their social use value and exchange value.

Nature’s Law

Finally, for Marx, the progressive awareness of freedom reaches its highest point not in the concept of self-reflection, formulated primarily in philosophy itself, but in a new socioeconomic order that replaces the existing capitalist mode of production (adopted by Hegel) with communism and others. Marx calls «socialized humanity». In other words, freedom or «self-alienation» is not something that philosophy tries to identify, but must be provided for by a liberation policy.

Freedom, as Hegel argued, is self-alienation, up to the dissolution of all subjectivities. This is something that is often lacking in Marx’s theory, especially in the Marxism of his closest contemporaries, and then those who adopted Marxist anti-positivist tendencies. Against the background of the relations of production described by him, Marx emphasizes the abolition of alienation in all its many forms. This includes traditional forms of alienation from nature (manifested in isolation and destruction of the family and, to a lesser extent, from capitalism), forms of alienation from the human self (human labor is depicted in an inhuman, inhuman way), and alienation from other people (most obvious in form of slavery). At the same time, Marx’s theory is nothing more than curious in its clear and unambiguous identification of the abolition of this multiple form of alienation and what Marx calls «self-alienation» with the realization of the freedom of «self-development» in all its ramifications. This «subjective freedom», as Marx calls it, is not just a matter of philosophy. Rather, it is a basic and fundamental demand for human emancipation, which presupposes a new socio-economic order that overturns the old class system in all its various forms.

This becomes clear in the thesis about the law of nature. This is clearly a Hegelian thesis, not a Marxist one, but its conclusions are decisive. It draws an analogy between the human species as a whole and the unity of living beings on the Earth as a whole. He emphasizes that humanity has not only created new rules of production, but thereby also created new rules for living things. It is in this respect that Marx’s concept of the «extended right of nature,» which was an example of what was called his «dialectical materialism,» refers to the unification of the right of the people with the «right of man to common property.» The difference in perspective, as well as the dialectical connection between these two ideas, lies in the fact that the basic material conditions of human existence as a species do not have an absolute form in any absolute sense, and especially not in an absolute sense. These are things like air and water, which are not necessarily surrounded by land or climate. In many ways, these abstract «things» are historically incorrect. Over the centuries, the cultural labor of mankind has taken forms characteristic of the specific social formations in which it is located. In particular, the social relations that characterize a particular society shape the nature of a person who finds himself in this particular society. It is this interaction between various forms of sociological reality (of which economics is a part) and specific cultural formations that Hegel defends in his Philosophy and Politics. At the same time, he argues that each of these forms of sociological reality has a «hierarchical development», when ultimately the forms of society «realize themselves» in what he calls the «metaphysical sphere.» They constitute an ethical unity and form the form of things that can be talked about. In other words, the form of ethical unity lies outside the given form of sociological reality. The word «abstract» is therefore a loaded term to apply to Hegel’s «metaphysical realm,» since abstractions are usually considered static, as modern physicists use it for mathematical models of physics. Hegel is more inclined to the idea that the «metaphysical kingdom» is something that cannot be canceled. A certain form of organization of people has a historical development, which turns it into a form of historical society, reproducing the conditions of its existence and at the same time the existence of the natural conditions of its existence. To say that a particular form of society is the form of the things that it represents presupposes the historical development of the human species as a whole, which takes on various forms. In this sense, it is an expanded form of forms of human existence in the sense that it includes the economic forms of this form of society.

Hegel in his idealism finds the first truly universal form of «self-consciousness», that is, a form of consciousness that precedes other forms of consciousness, a form that is «objective.» Marx and Hegel pursued here human historical form as a species that is a social, ethical which consists of forms, method of production, the culture forms etc. However, this is a form that can only be understood from the point of view of the historical development of the human community as a whole, and not the specific form of this community.

That is why Marx did not agree with what Hegel thinks when he writes the phrase «justification mode of production to the end» in the preface to his «logic». Hegel argues that this «justification» is a social, political and moral justification, while Marx insists that it is simply a political and economic justification. Marx fails to see that in this final form of production «justification» has gone beyond the bounds of ethical, political and moral and has become universal and law-like. He does not see that Hegel’s answer is a question about the conditions of production, whereas for him the question was what justifies the form of production in a particular form of society. The answer to this question lies in the «metaphysical realm.» The «metaphysical kingdom» cannot have an objective form, that is, it cannot be a form of nature. The metaphysical sphere is a form of cognition of the mind.

The idea that the ethical, political and moral justification are forms of ways of knowing the people themselves, and how they are related to political and economic social conditions of existence, does not mean that they are a singular social form of knowledge, and are unique in forms political and economic «objective justification». Any such form must always be accompanied by a «subjective justification». This means that every form of knowledge or other thing related to social reality must be governed by certain laws. He is and always understood vivo Recording the three forms of knowledge: knowledge of the nature, knowledge of humans as social beings and knowledge of people as human beings. Each of these forms of knowledge has a certain form of cognition of the mind or an ideal form of this knowledge. The ideal form has the form of the mind as the form of consciousness, so that the mental form of the ideal form is the object of science. For Marx, the ideal form of knowledge of the labor process is a «mode of production» as such, ie. splitting of labor and commodity fetishism. However, the «form of production» as such is not a «metaphysical» form of this knowledge. This is a social form of cognition of this knowledge. This is a law-like, «ethical» form of this knowledge, a form of justifying the mode of production.

It is in this law-like form of substantiating the social form of knowledge, on the one hand, that society or society as such stands, and on the other, concrete forms of this knowledge in itself and in society. Marx means that a form of justification for a mode of production like a law has a universal form of social justification that is not its own universal form, and that this universal form is not a form of nature.

So how does «diversity» fit into this picture? How can the diversity of this form of justification be explained?

Hegel’s «scientific» answer to this question is that the universal in the «metaphysical kingdom» is the law-like form of justification in society, namely the form of production as such, and not the form that is the form of the human being as such.

As for the «metaphysical area» as a form of cognition of reason, Marx claims that it does not have a form of reason as a form of consciousness, that is, a form of cognition of a part of nature, and that this is part of nature — nature. It is not a part of nature as such. By itself, it is not part of nature. This is only part of nature as a form of knowledge. This is a form of knowing people as social beings. Marx argues that there is a connection between the form of cognition of a part of nature as a form of cognition of this part of nature as a part of nature and the form of cognition of a part of nature as a form of cognition of a part of people as human beings. In other words, the form of cognition of a part of nature as a form of cognition of nature is a form of cognition of people as political and economic people, but it does not express what people are. Thus, he expresses what people are a part of. People are only part of nature. So, the form of cognition of people as part of nature is a form of cognition of a part of people as part of nature, and not of what people are. He expresses the fact that human beings are part of the «metaphysical kingdom.» What are people — the subject of science. The «metaphysical sphere» is a form of cognition of nature and society, a form of knowledge in itself, and not something that is a form of a human being as a human society.

Hegel’s answer to this question is that Hegel does not defend «practice» as a form of knowledge of nature. The «metaphysical sphere» is a form of knowledge about production as production, and not a form of production as a form of man as a human society. So, for Hegel there is no form of «practice» as such, there is no «metaphysical area» and there is no form of knowledge as such. There is only the world of production as such, not the form of «practice» as such. For Hegel, there is a distinction between the abstract and the concrete, which is used to deny the Hegelian dialectic. A thing cannot exist by itself, and the form of knowledge about a thing cannot exist by itself, that is, the form of knowledge cannot exist for its own content.

However, Hegel denies that the forms of knowledge of things cannot exist by themselves, just as nature cannot exist by itself, that is, as a separate thing from its environment, separate from nature itself. Nature does not exist for itself in the same way that forms of cognition of things exist by themselves, that is, as a separate thing from the form of cognition of things. Nature exists for itself in the form of the world or world system. But this does not mean that there is a form of knowing things for ourselves, which cannot exist for ourselves in the same way that nature exists for itself in the form of the world, the world system. It does not reflect what nature is. It does not express that there are things. This expresses a form of knowledge, a form of knowledge of nature. For Hegel, this form of knowledge represents the form of people as political and economic people.

This shows that there are different types of knowledge. These are ways of knowing people as human beings in a given society. The content of this knowledge is inherent in the nature of human society. For example, the content of knowledge about people as people in a given society is part of the subject of political and economic theory. This knowledge of man as a political and economic being, taking into account its specific social context, such as the special historical circumstances of the society in which it existed, and so on.

Cognition of people as human beings in a given society is not just a form of knowing a thing as a thing for oneself. This is not just a form of knowledge of the subject. This is a form of knowing people as human beings in a given society. The content of this knowledge is political and economic theory. This is a form of cognition of people as human beings in a given society, and it depends on the historical and historical-cultural conditions of this society.

Many of the issues related to Marx’s perception of Hegel are evident in his description of the political community. In particular, the fact that much of Marx’s thought is focused on the social aspects of Marxism in general, and not so much on the political side. Of course, Marx considers his work to be fundamentally political, and most of his works contain political material. As an example, we can point to the introduction of Marx in Capital. However, he usually views political parties and reform movements as temporary attempts to improve the position of the proletariat and the working class. While Marx did emphasize the social side of Marxism in Capital, it is clear that political activity takes up most of the work. Thus, Marx cared little for the bourgeois parties who tried to overthrow the state, reform existing political institutions and bring them in line with their desires. He considered the purpose of such actions not to improve the position of the working class, but rather to abolish the state and adopt a capitalist society. Marx’s view of political action is consistent with the political ideas of Marxist socialists such as Lenin, and his views on the movement towards socialist revolution were expressed in 1882 when he said that «the revolutionary socialists say… that a radical attack on bourgeois property is important, i.e. e. the abolition of private property, while at the same time, when we say… that the abolition of private property and the property of the system the means of production, in which it rests, is the main objective to be achieved, and that this process should be gradual».

Of course, Marx’s political activity in Capital is focused on the development of theoretical criticism of capitalism in general, and not on its implementation in political action. Marx’s activities in the political arena were limited to his struggle against political parties. Thus, although Marx calls himself a socialist, he calls his «political» activities «political atheism.» Moreover, he argued that he did not believe in the ability of «bourgeois democracy» to improve the position of the working class. For Marx, the entire political arena was illegitimate because of the state. Marxism thus meant that the working class must act outside the arena to change the existing conditions of exploitation.

Marxism as a philosophy of history

The reason I used Hegel’s concept of political community to argue that Marx opposed the general interests of society and prioritized the interests of a privileged minority over the interests of the working class is that it reflects an important aspect of the structure of Marxism. Marxism is not just a political theory; it is a philosophical movement. The structure of Marxism is the structure of a philosophical movement that is critical of the status quo. But this movement cannot be reduced to pure philosophical criticism of what is usually considered the historical conditions of society. It is, in its own way, a movement that formulates the needs and aspirations of the social class as opposed to the ruling class, which inevitably tries to suppress these needs and aspirations.

According to Marx, capitalism must inevitably end because the system it created was based on a middle class that was in a subordinate relationship with the working class. The working class was forced to sell its labor power to the capitalist class in exchange for a standard of living that the working class could not maintain. As Marx argued in his famous text Capital, the working class under capitalism produces the surplus value needed to sustain the capitalist system. This value did not belong to the workers, who, in turn, had no direct interest in distributing it among themselves. Marx tried to show that the working class and its production of value would ultimately destroy itself because the relationship of dependence between the workers and the ruling class was deeply and invariably unequal. After all, the working class must be self-sufficient and can no longer depend on the ruling class for its survival.

At the same time, the ruling class has an interest in maintaining the alienation of the working class. For this, a two-tier property system had to be created. The ruling class could rely on the functioning of the economy as long as workers were forced to sell their labor in exchange for a basic standard of living. To ensure this survival, the ruling class instituted a second-tier property system in which the owner class could directly control the means of production. At this second level, the working class could survive on a reduced subsistence level, but it would remain a class subordinate to the upper class that owns the means of production.

The struggle between the two classes is the defining struggle of bourgeois society and the main issue of the capitalist system. Since this struggle is inherent in the very nature of capitalism, the capitalist class has no choice but to use its economic and political power to maintain its dominance over the working class. In a capitalist system, the working class cannot take control of the means of production or the means of exchange unless the ruling class is willing to lower the working class’s standard of living or replace the working class with a middle class that pays their labor in exchange for a much higher standard of living.

The point is not that capitalism can be criticized from a purely philosophical point of view. The entire edifice of capitalism is built on this philosophically inspired form of criticism. But the main question remains: can this philosophically inspired criticism be revolutionized into a revolutionary political movement that will lead to the collapse of capitalism and the creation of a new society?

This is the task of Marxism: to synthesize Marxist criticism of capitalism into a program of political action that can successfully lead to the creation of a new, more humane and sustainable world.

The goal of Marxism is to criticize capitalism not from the outside, but from the point of view of the working class.

All reformist and progressive discussions about Marxism have completely ignored the radical dimension. Marxism is a program of revolutionary political action, not a criticism from outside the system. Marx’s programs and analyzes are revolutionary, not just critical. What defines a revolutionary Marxist program is the possibility of creating a truly new world in which the problems of hunger, homelessness, environmental disaster, discrimination and oppression will be solved once and for all. Such a program cannot exist outside the process of revolution. Such a program cannot exist without a revolutionary process. In the case of Marxism, the revolutionary process is the creation of a new world from the ruins of the old.

For some activists, Marxism and the proletarian movement are synonymous. In the history of Marxism, the proletariat as a class has never existed as an independent movement. He is always included in a big movement, whether it be fighting an imperialist war or another example of political reaction. For example, Marx and Engels wrote in their Communist Manifesto, in the section of the Communist Manifesto on the working class:

Бесплатный фрагмент закончился.

Купите книгу, чтобы продолжить чтение.