Бесплатный фрагмент - The problem of demarcation in modern science

Demarcation issues

In philosophy of science and epistemology, the problem of demarcation is the problem of establishing the boundary between science and philosophy of science.

Philosophers often try to show the boundary between science and philosophy of science by delineating the boundaries between disciplines or dividing fundamental assumptions about reality, such as time and space, or objectivity and subjectivity, into different theories of reality, thereby understanding the boundary between the philosophy of science and the science of science. Although it is the subject of many questions in philosophy of science and epistemology, the problem of boundaries, usually, focuses on the nature of scientific realism as applied to science.

The boundary between science and the philosophy of science is so contested that the most common method used to divide a subject is to demarcate the boundary between methods that produce data (or results) and tools that enable the collection and analysis of data (e.g. ideas, laws, structures, models, etc.).

The differentiation of the methods and tools that are used from those that define the method and tools is critical in the demarcation problem because it determines which parts of science are science and which are not.

When someone tries to cross the frontier in science, he begins to consider the philosophy of science, and both can be seen as a form of research.

Boundary problem and boundary demarcation refers to the dichotomy between formal «science» conducted by scientists and their approach to data collection and their use of data collection results.

Questions of the demarcation problem concern these different ways of researching the natural world by scientists.

Many philosophical questions have been raised to try to define the boundary between science and the philosophy of science. Many philosophers have tried to find a «core» of fundamental beliefs held by scientific disciplines, which would allow us to separate scientific positions from the positions of the philosophy of science.

The theory of scientific realism, according to which scientific hypotheses can be derived from the real world and tested scientifically, is often the subject of controversy when delineating. According to these principles of scientific realism, it is generally believed that any theory of reality is at least partially correct, and that any claim to the contrary should be questioned. According to this theory, all scientific methods available to scientists (and everyone else) are equally effective and there are no gaps in human knowledge. It is a fundamental element of scientific realism that is often the subject of controversy between scientists and philosophers of science. This objection can be challenged with a slightly more technical side of the issue, citing the existence of many fundamental principles of science that are outside the realm of human knowledge, and for example, such things as the existence of certain numbers.

More humorously, the use of a physical model, and therefore the existence of a real equivalent to Newton’s Newton, is often used to refute many of the claims made by philosophers of science.

Cognitive or interpersonal realism theory suggests that science is not fundamentally different from social and artistic endeavors. These forms of inquiry are often criticized as a form of biased or unverifiable belief systems that lack a sense of objective or subjective «truth.» Some argue that these forms of research are, in a sense, simply human-made. Proponents of this view argue that there is a fundamental drive to explore and learn about the natural world, and that any claims about objective «truth» are subjective to that drive. These positions have been used in the past to challenge the ethics of how science can be used to influence a person’s beliefs or behavior. Summarizing this, we can say that any statement that is or can be made without an objective basis is not scientific.

Cognitive / intersubjective stance can be tested by asking people to answer questions about how scientists behave and what standards they use to validate their claims.

People who accept the theory and accept the creation of causal models in which the universe operates are considered credible if they provide the foundation for that theory through logic and consistency.

Thus, the use of the inductive approach is usually seen as a legitimate means of defining truth in science. However, the use of inductive inference to support any general theory can be criticized.

Arguments for the validity of the inductive approach include the following: the use of observations is generally biased and subjective, the data must be manipulated to arrive at valid conclusions, the data must be used causally, people may behave in a biased manner in reporting their observations, people who accept some scientific theory tend to have the best critical thinking skills, and objectivity and testability are often associated with pure science.

The controversy continues after more than two millennia of dialogue between philosophers of science and scientists in various fields, despite broad agreement on the foundations of the scientific method. When considering the work of modern researchers, the question often arises which elements of science are responsible for the outstanding discoveries of the last few decades: quantum mechanics, the theory of relativity, the Big Bang, the Large Hadron Collider, or, perhaps more recently, the Higgs boson. Indeed, at the forefront of all these achievements is the first principle of modern physics — the laws of nature do not change. However, in recent decades we have learned that some phenomena do change and that science is not a true fact of nature; it is a constantly developing company. However, by its very nature, science is very diverse, and understanding how different branches of science refer to these fundamental principles is critical if we want to understand the evolution of our knowledge. It is often noted that there is no reason to seek truth, because truth is inherent in nature. The philosopher Ivan Ilyin, born in Russia, pointed out that truth is not the same as wisdom. We can make great advances in science by exploring how reality works. By discovering how nature can collapse under its own weight, in the form of black holes or the Big Bang, we learn more about the universe than thinking about why it has the properties we observe. The philosopher Roger Scruton does not understand the nature of truth so easily, and he quotes Cicero: «I think that everything that is false at first glance seems to be right, because the question in question is the truth of what he says and does.» Scruton insists that truth has two distinct meanings, which he calls «manifestly incompatible and contradictory.» The first is the absolute truth, which must be arrived at through observation and experiment. The second is a subjective concept of truth based on the knowledge of personal experience to arrive at beliefs and decisions. Scruton considers this understanding to be the correct foundation for intellectual life. The logical conclusion follows from this that «criticality» — the idea that our beliefs are based on empirical evidence — and «intellectual rigor» — the pursuit of truth — are in fact complementary aspects of scientific endeavor. But as the philosophy of science advanced and we learned more about the fundamentals of nature, we saw that the very concept of «truth» is not literal. All of this has profound implications for the study of science. The concept of the second law of thermodynamics, according to which entropy (rather than energy) always increases, is part of the mathematical identity of opposites, which essentially describes how an object in an open system attracts an infinitesimal amount of energy into its environment. However, in the late 1990s, physicist Lawrence Krauss and colleagues discovered that there were forms of matter that did not obey this mathematical law, and when they observed certain black holes, these anomalies told them that the second law of thermodynamics might not always be true. Since then, Krauss has made a career of applying science to questions that physics and theology cannot answer, from the philosophy of space and time to the problem of free will. Krauss drew an excellent analogy for scientific discovery, but there is another serious objection. Krauss argued that when a human form, such as a cell, encounters a certain obstacle, it can be in a state of thermodynamic imbalance or in a state of unstable disorder. But what does this have to do with the nature of things in the universe? For example, if the ocean suddenly dries up, how can we explain this? If our eyes could perceive physical changes, we might assume that whatever we perceive and perceive as an abstract phenomenon is created at this very moment — something really happens the moment our eyes detect the image. However, the presence of the «emergent effect» makes us realize that the scope of what we can observe was limited. An emergent effect, by definition, does not imply a change in the physical world. Thus, thermodynamic disequilibrium describes a macroscopic phenomenon, while emerging dynamics is a way of describing the microscopic itself. For example, William J. Boyd, a philosopher of science at Duke University, argues that the well-known observation of the three lobes of the brain suggests that some distinction still needs to be made between micro and macro.

Metaphysical tautology

Judging the veracity of statements about how reality functions based on their simplicity may seem like a remarkable achievement. Who can be sure, with all our modern technologies, that the Universe is what we see in front of us? Applying the Pythagorean theorem or saying that God is omnipotent is like using a ruler to measure the curvature of the universe. This, of course, does not mean that we cannot understand how true these and other self-evident statements about the nature of reality are. The problem, however, is that the enormous vastness of the universe and the extremely complex processes that we observe can be so overwhelming that they prevent us from thinking about possible alternative possibilities. We may want to change our minds, change our understanding of the world, but changing our perception is difficult, since most of what we observe is impossible to know. There are probably a million elements, each with a trillion different properties. And we cannot know with certainty about their internal structure or their functional interaction with each other. This fact does not prevent us from noticing them, using our feelings and interacting with them, but makes us very suspicious of their origin and existence. When we find ourselves in such mysterious situations, we are disturbed by the feeling that something is wrong with our knowledge. We use words such as tautology and contradiction to describe situations in which there are seemingly mutually exclusive statements describing the same situation. This is similar to the tautological statement, «A rose is a rose is a rose,» which is obviously true, and yet can be used as proof of the absurdity of the entire biological kingdom. The many patterns of experience that we perceive make us realize that something is fundamentally wrong with our state of knowledge. And we are both puzzled and suspicious of this «mistake», as if we are in the position of an innocent person being questioned by the police. Why can’t we just understand reality as it is? Why does the laws of nature seem to be created for our own amusement? This is another reason for the lack of a rational connection between science and theology. Both disciplines require knowledge that we cannot acquire in this way.

To understand what appears to be meaningless, there must be some transcendental reality to which the laws of nature do not apply. The existence of God provides this transcendental basis for understanding the world and allows us to recognize that we do not know the nature of reality at best.

We use our senses and think about experience in a way that completely avoids the rational aspect of our brains. The ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle in his work «Physics» argued that our perception of the world does not reflect external reality. His view of consciousness and our mental processes was that they do not reflect external reality. In his work, he has developed a body of knowledge related to a subset of the natural world, including the composition of matter, the movement of celestial bodies, the study of the growth of plants and animals and so on. His «philosophy» was based on his understanding of how these processes work and their implications for human existence. His view of the world was empirical, since he believed that our observations of the natural world can only be explained by reference to physical processes. The problem was that he could not explain why our observations of the world did not reflect the external reality of the world in any objective, scientific way. His explanation of consciousness, based on external reality, was also unsatisfactory.

Aristotle argued that the reason things seem to us to correspond to external reality was because we are unconsciously influenced by other beings we perceive, but this cannot be the reason that we observe things in the same order. The problem is that we are usually unaware of these influences, and therefore we have no way of knowing how the forces that act on us affect our perception. Thus, although it seems that we should see something this way because we experience it in this way, we do not. Moreover, we cannot use our senses to analyze how we perceive the world. This is the case where the explanation for perception must come from some form of externalism, in which our experience is not controlled by our brain, but rather determined by other external factors. For example, imagine that we are in outer space and look at the Earth, which for our senses seems like a distant star. In this case, we would be in an alien and alternative reality, and our experience would not have a basis in the nature of reality.

Another problem with the experience system, which must proceed from external reality, is that it cannot explain the diversity of our experience. We are in a system that gives us multiple and different experiences. While externalism gives us an explanation of why our experience is like this, it cannot give us an explanation of why our perception of these things is different. Thus, some externalist views argue that it is simply how differently we perceive things; others argued that different experiences could be explained on a more primitive or psychological level.

The philosopher William James developed an important doctrine to justify his view of the externalist theory of experience. This teaching is known as the law of similarities. James argued that each of us associates a stimulus with a certain object with which it has no physical connection, but is an object with which we can interact. We can imagine this object as having a different physical form or appearance than the object we originally responded to.

The similarity law is an explanation of why we perceive the world in this way. This explains why the externalist explanation of our experience of things does not work.

While the law of similarity itself is not a general explanation of how we perceive things, it explains why we are able to react to things differently from how we react to things that we encounter in the outside world. However, this does not explain why some people have different sensory experiences. This question has long been discussed in philosophy, but the most commonly proposed solution is related to cognitive abilities. One position is that the law of similarity explains why there are some people who do not perceive things in the same way as others. However, the hypothesis that this law is based on a general truth, the truth that explains why people do not see things the same way, is usually viewed as not supported by most philosophers. Instead, the main explanation suggested is that some of the differences in sensory experience can be explained on a more subtle level. For example, we may see an apple differently because of what we know about that apple. We know that the green apple was of the same species as the apple we see in front of us now, and therefore the differences in perception that we see are due to our knowledge.

Proponents of this mistaken view often misuse the law of similarity. While the concept of the Law of Similarity explains why we perceive things differently than other people, it does not explain why we perceive things the way. In my opinion, the reason why we perceive the world the way we do it is related to the processes of perception, which are not limited to similarities.

An early attempt at demarcation can be seen in the efforts of Greek natural philosophers and medical practitioners to separate their methods and their descriptions of nature from the mythological or mystical stories of their predecessors and contemporaries.

Plato first described his concept of «timesis», embodied the Aristotelian faith in human consciousness, in his «Timaeus» and in subsequent works.

The doctrine that perception is natural and not divine was a theme he developed in his Phaedra, which spoke of a «ghostly body» (a physical representation of an idea that a person is aware of).

Phaedrus also focused on the problem of universal knowledge, stating that everyone has access to all nature, but uses the only method available to them — their own perception.

The question of whether the material objects perceived by them are real or simply the result of perception has not been understood as a matter of faith.

Thomas Aquinas followed Aristotle and expanded on Plato’s ideas in the early thirteenth century in his Summa Theologica.

He believed that people can use their senses to determine «intellectually» the existence or non-existence of objects of perception.

It means that objects do not exist for the senses without our knowledge, but they exist, at least for those who have the ability to recognize their existence.

Thomas Hobbes argued that all objects can be cognized, although there is only one truth. Only human senses can know everything; all other knowledge is the result of assumptions.

In his later works, Thomas expanded his theories about the subjective relationship between sensory perception and sensitivity. The intellect can only perceive those things that exist, or at least exist in the realm of the senses; a thought that transcends this sphere of discrimination is known as a «poetic concept.»

Some philosophers have concluded that a philosopher can only perceive truth through the creation of a consciousness that precedes his or her own feelings. He must create «pure consciousness» before he can perceive the world, and thus he will gain access to the essence of things or knowledge about it. With a pure consciousness, a Christian can see what the Lord has seen, and he can become the unique being that God created him to be. Christian mysticism views nature as a living being created by the hand of God; without the power of Christ, nature is considered a meaningless mass of material.

Comparing this with Thomas Aquinas, it becomes obvious that he distinguishes his ideas from those of Plato and Aristotle. His concepts can be summarized as follows: «Faith, not reason, determines what can be cognized, and reason determines what cannot be cognized.»

Thomas was not aware of the various philosophical doctrines that developed after his death, it is more likely that he tried to synthesize different ideas and developed his own.

Thomas Aquinas in his work «Sum against the Gentiles» noted that although God is the only possible reason to believe in His existence, a person can perceive and know the existence of God through other reasons (namely, experience and logic) … In many cases, these «alternative causes» are obvious only to those who are not in the immediate presence of the object in question.

Later, Thomas developed and expanded these ideas in his later works to such an extent that they turned out to be his own ideas, rather than the ideas of the ancient philosophers with whom he was inspired.

In Christianity, Augustine Hippopotamus created his own theory of knowledge based on reason and experience. Augustine believed that the world is a single organism, and all things are products of one essence — God. Augustine believed that the intellect of God is active and separate from the physical intellect of the world; physical intelligence could only comprehend the world through experience. Using this concept, Augustine wrote that an ignorant person cannot have true knowledge of the world, but can only gain imperfect knowledge given to him through experience. An example of this would be if an ignorant person describes his experience with a tree; the knowledge of God will be expanded through real experience.

Augustine taught that for true knowledge of the world it is necessary to know the place, qualities and characteristics of various things in the world, but this knowledge was often very difficult to obtain. Augustine believed that nature should be greater than physical; it had to be experienced spiritually and immaterially. In his City of God, Augustine expands on his ideas about knowledge by saying that one must receive revelation through faith in Jesus Christ in order to truly know the nature of God. Augustine also noted that a person’s relationship with God is a relationship of love, not commitment.

Augustine believed that the true knowledge of the Lord was superior to any other knowledge, and that his knowledge was separate from the knowledge of other people. This was similar to Aristotle’s belief that human knowledge in nature was very limited because the human mind had not fully developed its potential.

Augustine also wrote that any true knowledge of the nature of God or the meaning of life comes to man through faith in Jesus Christ. Augustine also created his own cosmological system of the universe, in which he believed that the earth and all other natural objects are a physical manifestation of the divine. To truly understand the universe or the true meaning of life, you need to have faith in Jesus Christ and salvation.

Christians of the Christian Reformed tradition held some views similar to those of Augustine, although they generally differed from his ideas in that they believed that human knowledge of the world and the universe is limited.

Augustine’s doctrines and theological views began to spread throughout Europe in the sixteenth century with the works of John Calvin, Thomas Cranmer, and others.

The Roman Catholic Church held a higher degree of rationalism and believed that theology and metaphysics were unnecessary for salvation. However, the Roman Catholic Church did not reject the theology of Augustine, as it was of the opinion that it should be part of human understanding, and, therefore, a person is limited in his knowledge. The Roman Catholic Church was divided in its views on faith even regarding the ideas of Augustine, although the majority believed that human knowledge is limited, and therefore the only thing that salvation extends to is the doctrines of God.

Calvin himself was a Calvinist and adhered to the same ideas as Augustine, but added two different ideas to Augustine: in a first, Calvin believed that human knowledge is limited, but that through the Holy Spirit and faiths in man can reach the knowledge of the rational nature of God and secondly, that man is limited in his understanding of the nature of God, but through his actions he can achieve an understanding of God.

However, John Calvin rejected the doctrine that man was limited in his understanding of the universe; Calvin believed that through faith a person can know the universe and understand God.

Jean Calvin also explained Augustine’s epistemology and added that Augustine believed that everyone can receive a clear revelation about God through the Holy Spirit, through faith, and through reason.

In the sixteenth century, Johannes Reuchlin, an associate of Jean Calvin, was the first to write about Augustine’s philosophy, especially his doctrine of intelligence. Reuchlin made little reference to Augustine’s doctrine of grace, but rather to Augustine’s theology. Augustine always believed that the intellectual abilities of people are limited, and Reuchlin believed that this limited ability is the reason for a person’s need for salvation. Augustine taught that man is sinful and, as a result, cannot attain true knowledge. Reuchlin rejected Augustine’s teaching that humans are incapable of understanding the universe and that they need faith in God and use reason to be saved. Reuchlin believed that regarding Augustine’s view that human knowledge of God and the universe is limited, Reuchlin believed that Augustine’s view was wrong.

Augustine, according to Reuchlin, was wrong in teaching that man cannot receive true knowledge of the universe, but that man can attain knowledge through faith and the Holy Spirit in the knowledge of God. Although Augustine believed that human knowledge is limited, Reuchlin believed that human knowledge of the universe is unlimited. Reuchlin believed that with the help of reason, a person can receive a clear revelation about God and the universe.

Reuchlin was the first to suggest that human intelligence has unlimited potential. However, Reuchlin believed that a person’s ability to know is limited and that he can achieve knowledge of God only through faith and through the Holy Spirit.

Augustine believed that God is perfect, just, and good. Reuchlin believed that God was good and perfect, but the attributes of perfection were of such a nature that man could not achieve them. Reuchlin believed that the knowledge of God can be obtained through faith.

Reuchlin’s followers adhered to a form of Calvinism known as systematic theology.

Augustine, like Calvin, believed that human knowledge of God and the universe is limited. John Calvin, however, believed that man’s knowledge of the Universe is not limited, and believed that man is able to understand the Universe.

Calvin believed that man’s knowledge of God and the Universe is limited, but the use of reason can bring this limitation to man. Calvin did not believe that man’s ability to know the universe is limited.

It was not unusual for a sixteenth-century theologian to hold different views of the nature of God.

St. Augustine believed that through the Holy Spirit people can learn. This made him reject the system of modalism and force him to adhere to the doctrine of theosis, according to which a person can achieve a state of perfect communion with God.

Montaigne, a French philosopher and poet, wrote about Augustine’s epistemology and the knowledge of God. Montaigne believed that human knowledge is limited and that God can only be known through faith in God and the use of reason.

Montaigne believed that a person cannot have true knowledge of God without the help of God and the Holy Spirit. Montaigne believed that «the truth of faith is the only knowledge that can produce true knowledge.» Montaigne believes that there is only one and final truth, and that knowledge is obtained through faith in the «absolute one God.» Montaigne believed that faith, according to Augustine, is a means of knowledge, and the truth of faith is true knowledge. This led Montaigne to believe that if a person believes in a being outside the universe and if this being has infinite knowledge, then the person will reach a state that is known to God.

Gottfried Leibniz believed that human intelligence is limited by reason. Leibniz believed that man is limited in his understanding of the Universe, because he is limited by natural laws that limit his ability to perceive the Universe in its entirety.

Interpretation

Aristotle described in detail what scientific knowledge of something means. To be scientific, he said, one has to deal with causes, use logical evidence, and identify universals that are «inherent» in particulars of meaning.

The use of the senses must be consistent with our scientific research. As in Ancient Greece, we are fascinated by the mysteries of the world around us. There is an amazing world of form and formlessness, which is so indescribable, while inside we can see the complex details of reality and make judgments about what is right and what is wrong. We study all aspects of our experience and discover the universals and peculiarities of our experience.

We use the terms of our feelings as if they were nothing more than an abstract idea that we can integrate in our mind to see something or be something, but never think of it as a physical thing.

Here, according to Aristotle, there is an image of the sciences as images of each other. First, we have our own feelings, which we work with as if they were our abstract concepts. We perceive the table and turn it to see the reality of its hardness, the variations in its composition, the presence of chairs around it and the difference in color between them, and then we turn our eyes again to look at our concept. This concept is like a painting or film, and we turn our eyes to see the whole reality of that picture or film.

There is science as a picture of reality that uses our sensory experience, but has nothing to do with it. Our knowledge in physics is similar to our science of feelings and therefore consists of many thoughts of philosophers and scientists who came before us, who looked deeply into this world and saw its beauty and horror. The true image of our physics is a new world that offers an understanding of the nature of the natural world, the material world.

There is science as something that follows and develops from the science of the past. Each of us is born with a scientific education that we must use to solve our current problems and understand what really is in our experience. We must learn everything we can from the first stage of science, sensory experience, and use this knowledge to reach the second stage and then the third. Only in this way can we hope to reach the fourth stage, in which we comprehend the unknown universe of universal qualities.

Let me look at the works of Aristotle and compare them with modern scientific and mathematical journals. I want to compare science with other areas of knowledge such as philosophy, mathematics, and so on.

Modern scientific journals are compiled and edited by an elite group of scientists. Their contributions are assessed on the basis of mathematical and conceptual methods that are equivalent to the interpretations of Plato and Aristotle.

Mathematics — master of everything in science. Thus, all sciences are incomplete, and only mathematics is the absolute in our world.

So what does this have to do with your thesis? What ideas in your own research and what you say about it are wrong? What do you think is not true and how can you learn to understand the world differently?

I have often asked myself this question. While trying to make sense of my research, I found that when I tried to approach my topic scientifically, I completely failed. When I approach it as a pure idea, and not as a real, concrete image, it turns out that it is much easier to understand.

What was my method? I think there are things we can do if we approach our work from a new perspective.

M s can use their own conceptual knowledge. When you look at something in the real world, you can see what it is without trying to put it into words. But when you try to express a concept in words, you see something different, and therefore the translation cannot really reflect reality.

That is why sometimes it is very difficult to understand something, even if we are familiar with it. When someone talks about something, our mind tries to clothe this concept in a simple and understandable form, in words. This is what actually happens when we try to explain something in words. What we mean is not that there is «orange», but there is a whole, complex universe around it. But we don’t have a good way to describe such things, so we try to put it into words.

This is a natural thing, and we do it all the time when we try to describe the concepts of life, money, sports or the universe. There is an idea of what it is, but it is not always the same. When our mind tries to put it into words, we see something different. For example, when we try to describe a plate of food, we do not see a plate full of orange dale e k. We see a complex system of shapes, colors and smells. So if we cannot describe it in words, we try to abstract it into symbols. We use our knowledge of this complex system to try to describe what we see.

When we write an essay, the images we are using will be represented in red, the idea will be represented in green, and the idea of abstraction will be represented in blue. We can denote certain objects in orange, some blue, and so on, but on the way to represent these things will be different. We use this symbol to represent various ideas. This is how we conceptualize things, and since we conceptualize them, this is how we interpret them.

What we see is actually a series of real and imaginary things in a complex combination. The world is a complex system that is constantly changing, so the way we try to describe it is constantly changing. This is what I call the illusory universe.

So why don’t we just see the world as it really is? Well, because we can’t. We do not see it as it really is, and we cannot explain it in words. This is why we use words. This is how we represent what we see.

This is one of the important parts of my approach. I try to approach my topic from a different perspective. I look at this from the point of view of the idea of the object, not from the point of view of how it is actually seen. When my brain tries to explain it, I start looking at it from a different perspective. I’m starting to see this as a series of symbols.

How can this understanding be translated? What do we do when we see something we shouldn’t see? We must abstract ourselves from this. In other words, we move to another level and interpret the scene in terms of symbols. We use symbols to see things, but symbols are not what they actually appear.

We can see what we shouldn’t see, so we interpret the scene and explain it with symbols. To go one level higher, we use these symbols to abstract from the scene and explain it in terms of reality. This level of abstraction is what we have to do to make it easier to understand the world. This level of abstraction is what we have to do to simplify the explanation of the world. The point of this is to help us understand everything we have ever been taught and understand everything that is happening around us.

Logical positivism

Logical positivism, formulated in the 1920s, held that only statements about facts or logical relationships between concepts make sense. These statements are not called sentences, but are said to represent true beliefs.

It should be noted, however, that although «mereological» statements may be false, logical positivists also considered them factual, so the proper name for such statements is «perception».

Logical positivists believe that while such claims are possible, they must be false anyway.

Logical positivism originated in Hegelian philosophy, especially in his dialectics and its criticism. While making some dialectical criticism of determinism, determinism itself was not part of the Marxist analysis.

The philosopher Karl Popper proposed a synthesis of logical positivism, functionalism and socialism. Popper popularized the use of the term «positivism».

Logical positivism, formulated in the 1920s, argued that the truth of a statement is «whatever is consistent with observable facts.»

The concept of a truth principle in modern logic does not imply this — for example, the statement that «all numbers are rational» is not really a statement about what is true, but only about what can be proved.

Logical positivists also do not exclude so-called non-empirical statements.

The statement that «x» or «y» is more likely to be true in the case of «X» as opposed to the case «Y» requires that «X» and «Y» be consistent statements, which they claim to be means that logical positivists must argue that «truths» of this kind are not really «truths» or «truths» of the world.

However, most subsequent systems of epistemology, such as realism, positivism, and analytical philosophy, tend to assume that logical positivists were right in saying that there are non-empirical statements that are also true.

Practical applications such as medicine and legal practice tend to focus on statements that can be falsified or supported, and thus the assertion that true statements are necessarily true is removed from the problem of determining whether a particular statement is true or false…

However, since modern theories of mind and cognition are still often based on the traditional form of empiricism, the problem of non-empirical statements is still relevant.

The statement that «x» is more likely to be true in the case of «X» than in the case of «Y» is often viewed as an example of a reduction axiom with axioms of the form «x» and «y». truth is perceived as an obvious axiom of the existence of a relationship.

However, it has also been argued that such arguments presuppose the idea that there is no cognitive system — and therefore no belief system — that can speak of something other than itself, a view that has not gained widespread acceptance.

A particularly important form of logical positivism that is commonly associated with the scientific method has come to be known as logical empiricism and is closely related to the knowledge argument for the existence of God.

In the nineteenth century, Russell, Frege and most logical positivists defended the strong version of the thesis of the logical positivists: the «logical positivism», i.e. an adequate and correct theory of knowledge itself is a true science. Since then, this thesis has been questioned by some adherents of logical empiricism.

After Wittgenstein’s theory of concepts Wittgenstein influenced the logic, some of whom believe that what is true for proposals (including the logical positivists) is true for any «concepts», and some of them believe that the truth of one kind of truth is usually and necessarily linked with truths of a different kind.

The new thesis arose as a result of the development of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Most logical positivists denied the possibility of metaphysics; but there were some who thought that metaphysics was wrong on only one occasion, and that was when it gave meaning to things that didn’t really make sense.

Some logical positivists took this position and argued that metaphysics should only be taught in primary schools, if at all, and that metaphysics should have no place in higher education or professions. Others, however, argued that this position is inconsistent.

Russell called the first position «twice negative logic.»

In the second position, «double positive logic» describes the usual human use of language in which there is no opposition between sentences that imply or make sense of each other.

When Wittgenstein and his followers speak of an «intentional binding relationship,» they mean that the word must refer to something else in order to have meaning.

From this point of view, there is no metaphysics or even the science of metaphysics, because there is no opposite entity in the universe.

Many of the conclusions Wittgenstein is t e, which are known as anti comprehensionist, in fact, they argue that any relation between the world and the human mind, there must be.

In his Remarks on Foundations of Mathematics, Wittgenstein argued that (at least briefly and in extremely restrictive terms) there is no truth, reality or existence as we know them.

In his Treatise on Human Knowledge, and in his treatise on logic and philosophy, Wittgenstein believed that an attempt to explain the world of formal logic was likely to give a false idea of reality. Logical positivists were in principle open to these objections.

Wittgenstein later argued that the rejection of transcendental idealism (and therefore ontology) was a major mistake of logical positivists, because it led them to misunderstand the nature of objects. He called their position «superstitious» because it is based on the false belief that one can distinguish «what is real» from «what is false», which he himself considered dubious.

According to Wittgenstein, it is obvious to logical positivists that nothing real can matter and that everything that is either a phenomenon or an illusion (or something that can be called a phenomenon or an illusion). He called the approach of the logical positivists «superstitious» because it is based on the assumption that they can only explain the world «by the terms on which we are allowed to speak of what is real,» and that they did not realize that reality cannot be treated in this way.

As Wittgenstein argued, and as Fodor and Eilanden argued for his arguments, it is impossible to speak of «the world» using the terms adopted by logical positivists, and it is meaningless to say that it is possible to describe the world with the conditions they use.

Wittgenstein’s arguments show that it is impossible to explain the world in the language of logic (or his paradigm of language, Tractatus Logico — Philosophicus).

One of the results is that Wittgenstein believed that a person cannot even speak about what is real using the language of logic, since logic cannot identify what is real. He also argued that it is impossible to identify «that which is possible» with the terms in which they speak about him (and, in the same way, it is impossible to identify «that which is unreal» with the terms in which they speak about him).

According to Wittgenstein, both «unreal» and «impossible» can be defined based on the terms used to describe them.

It is important to note that all this talk about the language used to describe reality and the language used to identify things that cannot be spoken to are entirely conceptual. It is not at all obvious that language in general, or logic of statements in particular, can be used to describe reality or what is «impossible».

Logical positivists took Wittgenstein ’s arguments about what they were, about the impossibility of describing the world in language, as about the meaninglessness of statements. And in later life, Wittgenstein seems to have adopted the positivist assumption that language does not matter and cannot distinguish the unreal from the real.

However, this «logical positivism» is actually much more concrete than is usually assumed.

In the Tractatus Logico — Philosophicus, Wittgenstein argued that judgment is meaningful only if it can be used to determine, within a given language system, whether something is «real».

Thus, from a linguistic point of view, we could say that the word «non-existence» («nihil») or the phrase «there is no such thing as non-existence» («gaunenlos siegen nicht») are meaningless expressions.

It is important to note that the Tractatus does not state that the only sentence that matters is the true sentence. It is possible to define sentences in languages in which it is impossible to say anything about the meaning of a sentence so that they can be used to define what is real, and Wittgenstein even argued that sentences in such languages make sense.

The term «theory» is used by Wittgenstein in a completely different way. For him, theory is a formal system (in the sense of the «language of theory») in which a number of statements about the real are attributed to objects and properties in the model of the world.

It is not immediately obvious that it is possible to define a «model of the world» in the sense in which Wittgenstein used the term, but he did. The «model of the world» that Wittgenstein defines in this context is not a physical model, but a logical model. (This can be viewed as the same as how some prefer to think of it as a model of a given mathematical theory.)

A theory in theoretical language is a set of statements about the real that can be used to determine the reality of something.

A good example of a theory is Einstein’s special theory of relativity, which, thanks to the use of a mathematical formal language, is perfectly suited to describe what happens to an observer in a special system of relativistic physics.

If the model of the world doesn’t really explain everything about the world, then it may not be a very good model after all.

Indeed, some say that the logical positivist system can actually explain more about the world than any theory it discusses. But if the system of logical positivism is not a very good model of the world, it can still be used to determine whether something is real.

To use Wittgenstein’s terminology, the distinction between the real and the unreal for Wittgenstein is «visual.»

For logical positivists, the world is «non-visual».

Wittgenstein, however, does not regard the world as" non-visual, "and even if it were, it would not be a problem: it is entirely possible to describe the world in visual language. In any case, the world is a visual object, even if the universe it is in is not.

The central theme of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is his view that language cannot distinguish between the real and the unreal, that the world is an understandable world, and that the meaning of a statement can be determined using this statement.

Some critics have argued that these views do not «challenge» the traditional position that the world is understandable, but that they do challenge the old position that language cannot be used to distinguish the real from the unreal.

Development of ontological relativism

According to Alfred Jules Ayer, metaphysicians claim to have «a knowledge of reality that [transcends] the phenomenal world.» Ayer, a member of the Vienna Circle and a well-known English logical positivist, argued that it was impossible to make any statements about the world outside of direct sensory perception. If an empirical statement such as «The earth revolves around the sun,» Ayer argues, is a statement about the world outside the realm of sense perception, then that too cannot be explained.

The Philosopher John F. Bennett formulated the «ontological anti-realistic" view of truth and truthfulness, which defies the «spirit of ontological relativism that permeates much of metaphysics» and against what Ayer, George Dyson and many other philosophers opposed to competing concepts of metaphysics in the 20- m and 21st centuries.

Ontological realism in philosophy is the idea that objects exist independently of their behavior and relationships. Realism in this sense means that the objects in question and their relationships are real and do not depend on our beliefs and opinions. According to ontological realism, the truth of any statement about the relationship of an object, for example, «the table is actually a table,» does not depend on the person’s beliefs about the table, for example, «a table is probably a chair» or a person’s opinion about the relationship of a table to a chair, for example part of the table, «or even the relation of a chair to a table. For example, whether a person is sitting at a table depends on the statement «the table is the table,» which is a real statement. Ontological realism is usually associated with the positions of logical positivists. This school of thought emerged in the mid-1800s as a reaction to Cartesianism, which dominated the philosophy of science at the time.

Bennett argued that in accordance with ontological realism, people cannot know about objects or their relationships, because the logical consequences of this will be contradictory, that is, the very concept of «truth» (as opposed to an opinion or assumption), going beyond the phenomenal world, is impossible… For example, people cannot know about a table, and therefore the very concept of a table is beyond experience. The logical consequence of this fact is that the right to deny the existence of an object cannot be justified. As Bennett puts it, «if [an object] has no ’informative power’ other than our relationship with the world, then we are able not only to know its truth, but also to insist on its truth with thoughts, our own and others». The logical consequence of ontological anti-realism is that ontological statements about the world are invalid.

Bennett attributes ontological antirealism to logical positivists. For Bennett, positivists questioned the idea that a statement about an object’s relationship, such as «a table is actually a table,» is also a statement about that object, which Bennett calls an «ontological» statement. According to Bennett, ontological statements are too «abstract» to be true. For Bennett, an ontological statement about an object must represent the state of affairs with an object and must be able to justify a statement about an object. Thus, from Bennett’s point of view, a statement about the relationship of an object, such as «a table is actually a table», is also a true ontological statement, but its truth is incompatible with the truth of another ontological statement concerning the same object, that is, its relation to chair. Because of this incompatibility, statements about this object cannot be true if both statements are not true, which would be incompatible with the true nature of the object.

Bennett argues that ontological statements about the world are statements about being, not about reality. According to Bennett, this is why ontological statements can be false, and also why it is impossible to know about objects or their relationships. According to Bennett, ontological statements about the world are not just abstract ideas or opinions; these are facts about reality. According to Bennett, «although our sensory experiences are in fact real, not only is the possibility that our experiences are real entails that we cannot know that they are real, but it is an element of our being, the very possibility of our being, that is, they are not available to us.»